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Chapter 1
The Market for Retirement Financial
Advice: An Introduction
Olivia S. Mitchell and Kent Smetters
The market for retirement financial advice has never been more important
and yet more in flux. The long-term shift away from traditional defined
benefit (DB) pensions toward defined contribution (DC) personal accounts
requires all of us to become more financially sophisticated today than ever
before. But the landscape for financial advice is changing, with new rules
and regulations transforming the financial marketplace as well as the
financial advice profession. In the United States, more than 46 million
Baby Boomers are fast approaching retirement; and many are unprepared
to handle a range of concerns including when to stop working, when to
claim Social Security and DB pensions, how much to withdraw from retire-
ment saving and DC accounts, how to manage retiree medical expend-
itures, and whether (and when) to annuitize some of their assets. Younger
people confront a menu of additional decisions including managing mul-
tiple goals that compete for resources, such as whether to pay down loans
while targeting saving for homes and retirement, determining the appro-
priate level of precautionary saving, purchasing insurance, evaluating
bequest needs, and, of course, how to invest assets consistent with their
risk preferences.
The complexity of choices is enormous and in most cases daunting, and
many people are unable to make informed decisions without the help of
professional financial advisers. Financial decisions are very personal, and,
when queried, most people say they would like to speak one-on-one with
trusted professionals about their own situations (Charles Schwab, 2010;
Doyle et al., 2010) rather than seek advice from online tools or general
seminars. But who are these professionals and what standards must they
abide by? How do they make money and what are their incentives? How can
one protect clients from bad advice, and what is good advice? Does advice
alone effect changes in personal habits?
Answers to these questions, along with new technology that will decrease
the delivery costs of advice, will play a transformative role in helping more
households receive the quality financial advice that they need. But the
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job is a big one. In the United States alone, between 15 and 32 million
households are willing to pay to receive financial advice—but most do not,
often regarding advisers as unaffordable, conflicted, or offering an unclear
value proposition (Doyle et al., 2007; Janowski, 2012). For instance, Mangla
(2010: n.p.) recently wrote:
Unfortunately, finding objective, affordable, individual advice from a live person
can be a challenge. Many ‘financial advisers’ are simply brokers who get paid to
push products. And while fee-only planners, who don’t earn any commission, may
have fewer conflicts, they typically prefer to work on contract with people who are
already quite wealthy. Then too, the cost can go well into the thousands per year.
And as Lieber (2011: n.p.), of the New York Times, recently put it:
Advice from a human being is sorely lacking when we sign up for workplace retire-
ment plans, and there is a severe shortage ofmoderately priced financial advisers who
will help non millionaires and put customers’ interests ahead of their own.
For their part, regulators are not sitting idle. Instead, around the world
there is intense debate about how to structure the marketplace for retire-
ment financial advice, along with a regulatory renaissance generating many
new rules to address these problems. The United Kingdom and Australia
have recently passed laws that essentially ban the commission-based selling
of investment advice due to conflicts of interest. Germany appears to be
making strides in that direction as well. In the United States, the movement
toward less-conflicted advice has several fronts. But reform is moving more
slowly in America than in Europe, partly due to regulatory fragmentation,
industry resistance, and lack of consumer understanding.
Tax-deferred retirement plans in the United States are regulated by the
Department of Labor (DOL) under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA) of 1974. This legislation, along with subsequent
rulings, has conventionally deemed workplace financial advice to be a
‘prohibited transaction,’ meaning that pension plan sponsors take on
fiduciary liability if they provide investment guidance.1 But the 2006 Pen-
sion Protection Act and clarifications in 2007 did open the way for invest-
ment advice at the workplace under rules that sought to reduce conflicts of
interest between plan participants (employees) and investment advisers
(those giving advice). The DOL continues to examine a range of related
issues, including whether general ‘education’ (a topic which usually
escapes its review) constitutes ‘advice’ that it should regulate.
Outside of ERISA-covered retirement accounts, investment advice in the
United States is regulated by a multitude of different entities. Large Regis-
tered Investment Adviser (RIA) firms—generally, firms with $100 million
or more in assets under management—are supervised by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC). Smaller RIA firms are regulated by individual
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states, typically under the guidance of the Uniform Securities Act (along with
modifications that differ between states).2 All human advisers (known as
Investment Adviser Representatives, or IARs) operating under a RIA entity
must serve as legal fiduciaries that are bound to put client interests first. As a
result, RIA firms are generally paid by fees coming directly from clients,
either in the form of planning fees and/or as a percentage of assets under
management. By contrast, broker-dealer representatives who tend to work at
larger national firms do not have to put client interests first. Rather they
must only make sure that the investment advice is ‘suitable’ for the client.
Broker-dealers are typically compensated with commissions they receive
from the investment companies, a fact that is often not clear to the clients.
Brokers-dealers are regulated by a ‘self-regulatory organization’ known as the
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA).
If these distinctions were not already confusing enough, many financial
advisers are so-called dual-registered: they operate as both RIAs and broker-
dealers. Dual registration produces a problem that the US Government
Accountability Office (GAO, 2011) refers to as ‘hat switching,’ where
advisers alternate seamlessly between their roles as fiduciary-level advice
givers and conflicted salesperson, typically without the client understand-
ing the distinctions.3
More recently, the US Dodd-Frank Law which was passed in response to
the 2008 financial crisis mandated that the SEC explore and propose a
consistent uniform fiduciary standard. In apparent retaliation, recent legis-
lation introduced by some members of Congress attempted to shift much
of the SEC’s investment advice oversight to FINRA for practical purposes.
This counterproposal, though, has confronted stiff resistance from advisers
concerned that the FINRA will fail to enforce a true fiduciary standard and
increase compliance costs. In response, FINRA has sought to reposition
itself as more accommodating to higher advice standards, by redefining the
‘suitability’ standard to a level of care that incorporates elements of the
fiduciary standard. Whether this new standard will be chipped away if
FINRA obtains a fuller set of regulatory responsibilities vis-a`-vis the SEC is
an open question.
While regulators, policymakers, business interests, and consumer groups
carry on the long and intense battle over this important legal landscape,
many people need practical help in the meantime. Boomers, in particular,
cannot wait, and their children and grandchildren also require advice in
an ever-changing financial arena. Plan sponsors designing benefit plans,
along with the consultants guiding them, must also move ahead to do what
they can from a practical viewpoint. This volume seeks to contribute to a
greater understanding of how the market for financial advice works, what
the pitfalls are, and what consumers, plan sponsors, advisers, and regula-
tors can do to better manage the risks.
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What do financial advisers do?
In what follows, we begin with a discussion of the practices of financial
advisers, how they actually operate, and the advice they provide. The
chapters offer perspectives from an interesting blend of academics and
practitioners, who have considerable ‘street’ experience giving advice to
real clients. To set the stage, Turner and Muir (2013) explore the financial
adviser space and address the question of what is meant by the term
‘financial adviser.’ Surprisingly, the answer is not straightforward, as
many different sorts of individuals call themselves financial advisers.
A practical viewpoint is provided by Hogan and Miller (2013), who are
independent advisers taking a holistic perspective when assessing client
needs and explaining risks. Their work examines several common pitfalls
in explaining risks to clients, as well as how to do a better job. They show
how different approaches to discussing risk can lead to very different client
perceptions and choices.
The chapter by Greenwald et al. (2013) examines how advice helps shape
when people claim their Social Security benefits in the United States. Most
workers are discouragingly poorly informed about how Social Security
works, and most claim benefits currently at age 62, far earlier than many
experts believe is optimal. Building on a survey and in-depth interviews, the
authors examine information about how advisers and plan sponsors coun-
sel clients and participants on Social Security. Their results point to ways to
increase the effectiveness of education and advice on Social Security and
claiming.
Pension asset allocation is examined by Munnell et al. (2013), focusing
on how this can help influence retirement security. In the US context, they
conclude that most workers save relatively little, so they suggest that
advisers should emphasize boosting saving rates instead of concentrating
on asset allocation. Jones and Scott (2013) describe the factors encour-
aging employees to enroll in the workplace-based asset management pro-
gram that their firm, Financial Engines, provides to plan sponsors. The
company derives most of its revenue from managing DC account assets on
behalf of workers.
In addition to saving and investment, stakeholders also need help in
deciding how to manage their money so as not to run out in retirement.
Accordingly, Hueler and Rappaport (2013) note that financial advice can
strongly shape employees’ decisions to annuitize part of their pension
assets. Hueler’s innovative lifetime annuity platform is offered by some
plan sponsors as a means to help retirees generate income protection
over their entire lifetimes. While life annuities currently represent only a
small fraction of total annuity sales, this chapter explores how financial
advice can play a key role in adoption.
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Measuring the performance and impact
of financial advice
Next, the volume turns to an in-depth evaluation of the impact of financial
advisers asking: do they matter; do they do a good job; and do they have an
impact on client choices and behavior? Zick and Mayer’s careful analysis
(2013) points out that many prior studies fail to identify the clear impact
of financial advisers in effecting change because they have not used a
scientific randomized approach in the analysis. Moreover, the few studies
that do are limited in their delivery of financial advice. The authors offer
a useful roadmap guiding serious evaluation efforts if one is to clearly
identify the impact of advisers on outcomes.
In an interesting experimental study, Hung and Yoong (2013) use the
RAND American Life Panel to explore whether enhanced behavior can
be attributed to actual investment advice. They come to two interesting
findings. First, unsolicited general advice has a limited effect on investment
behavior. Second, people who actively solicit advice do improve their
performance, but they are not a randomly selected group. As a result,
their results suggest that general advice might not be a ‘silver bullet.’
That is, plan sponsors and policymakers may need to consider additional
mechanisms (including how to make advice more personalized), and to
allow participants receive more help with actual implementation of advice.
The related chapter by Hackethal and Inderst (2013) notes that financial
advice can benefit consumers by bridging gaps in knowledge and facilitat-
ing transactions, but in practice, it is often used to exploit consumers’ lack
of financial literacy and inexperience. In an effort to correct this problem,
regulators have sought to enact policies that mandate more disclosure
regarding products and conflicts of interest. But the authors argue that
these measures often fall short of creating tools and policies to enhance
transparency. For instance, the financial products could be much simpler
and more uniform, making them easier to compare. Additionally, policies
could ensure that the quality of advice improves, perhaps by having advisers
meet higher standards of qualification, or giving them appropriate incen-
tives to gather information and provide unbiased advice.
In his chapter on adviser services, Finke (2013) proposes that advisers
can substitute for costly investments in specific finance-related human
capital that may not be efficient for households or society to engage in as
a whole. Nevertheless, even when financial advisers improve financial
outcomes, and when the adviser’s and households’ interests are aligned,
professional advice can still harm consumers if conflicts of interest create
high agency costs. Fee compensation may reduce agency costs associated
with commission compensation, such as the incentive to increase portfolio
turnover and recommend low-performing investments. Fees may also
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reduce the focus on short-term advising services by creating an incentive to
establish a long-run advising relationship. One way to reduce possible
agency costs under commission compensation might be to eliminate com-
missions and apply a uniform fiduciary standard among financial advisers.
Using several different surveys, Holden (2013) explores when, why, and
how mutual fund investors use financial advisers. Among other issues, she
looks at whether certain ‘trigger’ events prompt fund investors to seek
professional financial advice, and she analyzes whether some investors are
more likely to work with advisers than others. The level of assets appears
to be a key marker, with households that have an advisory relationship
reporting a median of $170,000 of household assets, compared to a median
$85,000 of among households that do not have an advisory relationship.
Market and regulatory considerations
The third section of this volume takes up regulatory and market consider-
ations. Laby (2013) deals with the way that brokers and advisers may
perform similar functions yet are regulated differently under US laws
dating back to the Great Depression. The labels used by financial services
providers tend to confound investors; federal securities laws contain separ-
ate regulatory schemes for brokers and for advisers; and the duties and
obligations differ under each. Regulators are currently pondering how to
harmonize these regulations, but the process is fraught with difficulties.
Furthermore, although brokers and advisers historically provided distinct
services, today their roles are often similar or nearly identical. Yet since
regulation has not kept pace with changes in the industry, brokers and
advisers remain subject to separate regulatory regimes. The US Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) is considering whether to harmonize the
regulation of broker-dealers and investment advisers and place a fiduciary
duty on brokers that give advice to retail customers, subjecting them to a
higher duty of care.
The US Government Accountability Office (GAO) is also exploring a
regulatory gap, as explained by Bromberg and Cackley (2013). Currently,
no single law governs providers of financial planning services. Many invest-
ors find the standards of care confusing, and they do not appear to
appreciate the differences between investment advisers and broker-dealers
or the standards of care that apply to them. Consumers generally do not
understand the distinction between a suitability and fiduciary standard of
care, nor when financial professionals are (or are not) required to put their
client’s interest ahead of their own. The authors outline several different
approaches to create a more unified approach.
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A look ahead
In the wake of the financial crisis, numerous analysts and policymakers
have expressed deep concern about the extent and consequences of con-
sumer financial ignorance. For instance, the US President’s Advisory Coun-
cil on Financial Literacy (PACFL, 2008: n.p.) has expressed concern that
‘far too many Americans do not have the basic financial skills necessary to
develop and maintain a budget, to understand credit, to understand invest-
ment vehicles, or to take advantage of our banking system. It is essential
to provide basic financial education that allows people to better navigate
an economic crisis such as this one.’ In a similar vein, Federal Reserve
Board Chairman Bernanke (2011: 2) argued: ‘In our dynamic and complex
financial marketplace, financial education must be a life-long pursuit that
enables consumers of all ages and economic positions to stay attuned to
changes in their financial needs and circumstances and to take advantage
of products and services that best meet their goals. Well-informed con-
sumers, who can serve as their own advocates, are one of the best lines of
defense against the proliferation of financial products and services that are
unsuitable, unnecessarily costly, or abusive.’ And the US DOL has esti-
mated that pension participants could save billions of dollars a year in
financial mistakes, if they were better versed with regard to financial advice
(Turner and Muir, 2013).
While we focus here on ways to make markets work better for saving,
investing, and decumulating retirement assets, there is one topic we do not
address in detail as it deserves a separate and lengthy treatment on its own:
how to plan for and manage retiree medical care expenditures. In the
future, these costs will inevitably rise due to extending longevity and
healthcare cost inflation. Additionally, in the United States, many employ-
ers have terminated their retiree medical insurance programs over the last
decade, and the few still providing plans have imposed higher contribution
rates, rising copayments, and higher deductibles.4 The Affordable Health
Care Act will interact with the projected solvency problems confronting the
Medicare program, implying that future retirees will surely be need to pay
more for medical costs than in the past.5 Yet few employees are well-versed
about their employer’s retiree medical insurance offerings or what benefits
are available through Medicare,6 implying a large and growing role for
financial advice in this arena as well.
Looking to the future, regulatory efforts are underway in many nations
to address informational issues and to rationalize the application of
fiduciary standards, in the hopes of increasing the quality and quantity
of investment advice to support retirement security. But in the long
run, better-educated and informed stakeholders will need to bear a
larger role in managing their retirement accumulation, investment, and
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decumulation processes. Accordingly, there seems little choice but to
bring to market more appropriate products, explain them better, and
price them fairly, so participants in the retirement advice marketplace do
a better job managing retirement risk. To this topic we turn next.
Endnotes
1. Some exceptions existed, most notably the DOL December 14, 2001, Advisory
Opinion to SunAmerica Retirement Markets which allowed certain asset alloca-
tion services to participants in ERISA-covered plans. See <http://www.dol.gov/
ebsa/regs/AOs/ao2001-09a.html>.
2. Most states require legal registration of the RIA, mandate that each adviser pass a
Series 65 or similar exam (although some states exempt individuals holding
the CFP® designation), and submit a U4 background application. The state of
Florida and a few others require advisers to also submit fingerprints.
3. This might be akin to medical doctor having a financial interest in the com-
panies producing medications that he prescribes to his patients.
4. As Fronstin (2010) notes, the Financial Accounting Statement No. 106 (FAS 106)
of 1990 requiring private sector employers to account for the liabilities associated
with post-retirement healthcare insurance prompted many firms to cut back and
even terminate these plans.
5. The Employee Benefit Research Institute (2009) estimated that the present
discounted value of an average couples’ out-of-pocket expenditures (exclusive
of employer subsidy) would total $268,000. At the 90th percentile, the estimated
cost was $414,000 and inclusive of Medigap/Part D premiums, $807,000.
6. See, e.g., Schur et al. (2004) and Kaiser Public Opinion (2011).
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